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FEDERAL PREEMPTION-STATE DRAM SHOP LEGISLA-
TION IN CONFLICT WITH FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINIS-
TRATION REGULATIONS-THE SUPREME COURT OF
GEORGIA DECLINES TO HOLD THAT THE AIRLINE DER-
EGULATION ACT MANDATES PREEMPTION OF THE
GEORGIA DRAM SHOP ACT AS IT APPLIES TO AIR
CARRIERS
SARITA ANNE SMITHEE*
X STATE LAW is preempted by a federal law when Congress
xpressly states that the federal law will have a preemptive
effect, when such preemption may be inferred from a pervasive
regulatory scheme, or when the state law conflicts with the fed-
eral law.' Absent an express statement by Congress that a fed-
eral law has preemptive effect, an inquiry must be made to
discern either Congressional intent to enact a pervasive regula-
tory scheme or a direct enough conflict between state and fed-
eral law to warrant a finding of preemption.
State laws and federal regulations addressing similar issues in-
vite consideration under preemption analysis. For example, the
Georgia Dram Shop Act provides, in part, the following:
[A] person who willfully, knowingly, and unlawfully sells, fur-
nishes, or serves alcoholic beverages to a person ... who is in a
state of noticeable intoxication, knowing that such person will
soon be driving a motor vehicle, may become liable for injury or
damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such mi-
nor or person when the sale, furnishing, or serving is the proxi-
mate cause of such injury or damage.'
However, a Federal Aviation Administration regulation, 14
C.F.R. § 121.575, provides that airline personnel may not serve
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any alcoholic beverages aboard an aircraft to any person who
appears to be intoxicated.3 The Airline Deregulation Act, en-
acted by Congress in 1978, provides, in part, that "[a] state ...
may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision
having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or
services of any air carrier . . . ." An issue is thus raised as to
whether 14 C.F.R. § 121.575 and the Georgia Dram Shop Act
are in conflict with each other or whether the Airline Deregula-
tion Act is evidence of a federal regulatory scheme, if not an
express statement mandating preemption of state tort law as it
applies to air carriers.
In late 2005, however, the Supreme Court of Georgia errone-
ously held in Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Townsend that the question of
federal preemption by the Airline Deregulation Act ("ADA")
was moot in the case of a non-passenger's claim under the Geor-
gia Dram Shop Act ("GDSA") against an airline for allegedly
serving an intoxicated passenger who was later involved in an
automobile accident injuring the claimant.5 Despite the fact
that 14 C.F.R. § 121.575 ("the FAA regulation") and the GDSA
address precisely the same issue, service of alcoholic beverages
to intoxicated persons, the Supreme Court of Georgia gave no
attention to potential conflicts between the FAA regulation and
the GDSA or to congressional intent in enacting the ADA, in-
stead choosing to address the merits of the claim under Georgia
law.6 The Supreme Court of Georgia found that the burden of
proof under Georgia law had not been met and ultimately
elected not to reverse the Georgia Court of Appeals' holding
that the ADA did not mandate preemption of claims against air
carriers under the GDSA.7
On March 29, 2001, Jack Townsend, a twenty-five-year-old col-
lege graduate on the verge of being certified to be a school
teacher, was driving home in north Atlanta.8 A few hours ear-
lier, James Serio, a fifty-year-old software salesman and youth
minister, had been on a Delta flight from Milwaukee to Atlanta.9
3 14 C.F.R. § 121.575 (2002).
49 U.S.C.A. § 41713(b) (4) (A) (West 1997). The ADA amended the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958.
5 Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Townsend, 614 S.E.2d 745, 749 (Ga. 2005).
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Bill Rankin, Delta Liable for Drunken Driver?, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION,
Apr. 19, 2005, at Al.
9 Id.
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While Serio was enjoying his first-class seat on the two-hour trip,
Delta flight attendants allegedly served him more than six
glasses of red wine."' Tragically, on March 29, 2001 at 10:30
p.m.,James Serio was driving home from the Atlanta airport and
crossed the center line of the road, strikingJack Townsend's car
head-on.'" Townsend was severely injured and sued not only
Serio but Delta Airlines as well. 12 Serio pleaded guilty to drunk
driving, and Delta faced potential liability under both federal
aviation law and the GDSA.'3
Townsend first elected to proceed under the GDSA and com-
mon law negligence. 4 Delta moved to dismiss, arguing that the
GDSA did not apply to interstate airline flights; Townsend then
amended his complaint to add a claim for a violation of the ap-
plicable FAA regulation, 14 C.F.R. § 121.575.15 Delta responded
by removing the case to a federal court which, because the FAA
regulation provided no remedy for non-passengers injured by
an airline's service of alcohol to intoxicated passengers, dis-
missed the federal claim and remanded the case to superior
court in Georgia for adjudication of the remaining state law
claims.'" The superior court held that the GDSA had no appli-
cation to an airline's service of alcohol on an interstate flight
because such an application would give the state law improper
extraterritorial effect and thus dismissed Townsend's GDSA
claim, sending the matter back to the Georgia Court of Appeals
for a new trial to determine whether Delta had violated the FAA
regulation. 17
The court of appeals reversed, holding that reading the com-
plaint in the light most favorable to Townsend would not neces-
sarily result in giving the GDSA extraterritorial effect. 8 The
court of appeals then addressed the issue of federal preemption
in discussing whether the ADA mandated preemption of the
GDSA, finding no express or implied preemption of Town-
send's claim and, because they both ultimately prohibit the ser-
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Bill Rankin, Delta Cleared in Alcohol Suit, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION,
June 17, 2005, at Fl.
13 Id.
14 See Townsend v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 605 S.E.2d 54, 55-56 (Ga. Ct. App.
2004); 14 C.F.R. § 121.575 (2002).
15 Townsend v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 605 S.E.2d at 55-56.
16 Id. at 56.
17 Id.
is Id. at 56-57.
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vice of alcoholic beverages to intoxicated persons, no conflict
between the FAA regulation and the GDSA.'9 The court of ap-
peals held that the GDSA preempted Townsend's remaining
state law claims and allowed Townsend to proceed only with re-
spect to his claim under the GDSA.2 °
The issues facing the Supreme Court of Georgia were whether
the court of appeals was correct in holding that Townsend's
claim under the GDSA was not preempted by the ADA and, if
so, whether his stated claim was viable. The court, in addressing
the merits of Townsend's claim under an extremely strict con-
struction of the GDSA, side-stepped the issue of federal preemp-
tion by holding that Townsend failed to meet his burden of
proof under Georgia law, thereby holding that the question of
federal preemption was moot.21
The Supreme Court of Georgia was incorrect in holding that
the federal preemption question was moot in this case because
there is clearly a conflict between the FAA regulation and the
GDSA. Both the federal regulation and the state statute address
precisely the same issue: the service of alcoholic beverages to
intoxicated persons.22 The ADA is part of a federal deregulatory
scheme, and, under the Supremacy Clause, state laws that are
inconsistent with that scheme are subject to federal preemp-
tion.2 3 Moreover, the ADA itself contains an express preemp-
tion provision that prevents the enforcement of state laws
directly affecting airlines' rates, routes, and services.24 The
GDSA, as it applies to the aviation industry, affects airline ser-
vices and, therefore, claims brought against an airline under the
GDSA are subject to preemption by the ADA.
Congress enacted the ADA in an effort to increase efficiency
and quality in the air carrier industry through competition in
the market, freeing airlines from restrictive state regulation.21
Thus, state legislation directed toward the airline industry that is
inconsistent with this purpose is subject to preemption under
the Supremacy Clause. 26 Even if the ADA did not contain an
19 Id. at 57.
20 Id.
21 Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Townsend, 614 S.E.2d 745, 749 (Ga. 2005).
22 GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-40(b) (West 1998); 14 C.F.R. § 121.575 (2002).
23 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
24 49 U.S.C.A. §:41713(b) (4) (A) (West 1997).
25 SeeCharas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259, 1262 (9th Cir. 1998).
26 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S.
88, 98 (1992); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 652 (1971).
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express preemption provision, the Georgia Court of Appeals was
mistaken in claiming that there is no conflict between the GDSA
and the FAA regulation because Congress intended to foreclose
state interference in the deregulation of the airline industry by
enacting the ADA. 7 The court of appeals held that because
both the statute and the regulation ultimately prohibit the same
activity, they are consistent and preemption is not mandated.2"
However, the determination of whether a state statute is in con-
flict with a federal statute and is thus invalid under the
Supremacy Clause, is essentially a two-step process involving,
first, the construction of each statute and, second, addressing
the constitutional question of potential conflict.29
Under this analysis, a court must examine both the stated pur-
pose and the effect of each statute." Any state legislation that
frustrates the full effectiveness of federal law is preempted con-
stitutionally by the Supremacy Clause." In analyzing whether
there is a conflict, "the task ... is to determine whether state
regulation is consistent with the structure and purpose of the
federal statute as a whole. '3 2 There is a sufficient conflict when
the state law has a direct and substantial impact on the federal
scheme. 3 Allowing state courts to adjudicate claims brought
against airlines under a state's dram shop legislation is plainly
inconsistent with the broader federal purpose of deregulation of
the airline industry embodied in the ADA. 4
To further safeguard against a state's undoing of federal der-
egulation with regulation of its own, the ADA expressly prevents
the states from interfering with its deregulatory scheme by way
of a broad preemption provision, which provides that "a
State . . .may not enact or enforce a law, regulation or other
provision having the force and effect of law related to a price,
route or service of an air carrier."35 The Supreme Court of the
United States has interpreted this language in expansive fashion
to mean that the ADA mandates preemption of any "[s] tate en-
forcement actions having a connection with or reference to air-
27 Townsend v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 605 S.E.2d 54, 58 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
28 Id.
29 U.S. CONST. art. Ni, cl. 2; Perez, 402 U.S. at 644.
30 Perez, 402 U.S. at 652.
31 Id.
32 Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).
'13 Id. at 107.
34 See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992).
35 Id. at 378-79; 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (West Supp. 1999).
2006]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
line 'rates, routes, or services.'" 3 6 This preemptive effect applies
unless the state action in question affects airline rates, routes, or
services in "too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner. 37
Townsend's state law claims unquestionably relied on the en-
forcement of a state law. Townsend was not seeking recovery
solely for Delta's breach of its self-imposed undertakings in a
way that would amount to Georgia's failure to enforce its own
laws 8.3  Townsend's claim is, rather, that Delta violated Georgia
common and statutory law by its service of alcohol to passen-
gers. 9 This claim "cannot be adjudicated without resort to
outside sources of law," and it is, therefore, subject to preemp-
tion by the ADA if it relates to airline rates, routes, or services in
more than a tenuous, remote, or peripheral manner.4 °
The court of appeals found that there was no federal preemp-
tion based on the second part of the inquiry, deciding that the
state law claim under the GDSA did not relate to an airline's
rate, route, or service in more than an overly tenuous, remote,
or peripheral manner.'" Admittedly, courts have struggled to
define which airline services Congress intended to preempt in
enacting the ADA; however, Townsend's claim involves Delta's
in-flight beverage service, which is plainly within the range of
services airlines routinely provide to their passengers.4 2 As the
Fifth Circuit has held, an airline's provision of food and drink is
"appurtenant and necessarily included with the contract of car-
riage between the passenger or shipper and the airline. '43 In
support of its holding, the Fifth Circuit relied on the ADA's leg-
islative history and cited the following Civil Aeronautics Board
comment regarding the scope of ADA preemption: "preemp-
tion extends to all of the economic factors that go into the provi-
36 Morales, 504 U.S. at 384.
37 Id. at 390; Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 229 (1995); Smith v.
Comair, Inc., 134 F.3d 254, 257 (4th Cir. 1998).
38 Wolens, 513 U.S. at 228.
39 Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Townsend, 614 S.E.2d 745, 747 (Ga. 2005).
- See Wolens, 513 U.S. at 233; Smith, 134 F.3d at 257.
41 See Townsend v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 605 S.E.2d 54, 58 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
42 Compare Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259, 1265-66 (9th
Cir.1998) (en banc) (holding that "service" in the ADA's pre-emption provision,
"when juxtaposed to 'rates' and 'routes,' refers to such things as the frequency
and scheduling of transportation, and to the selection of markets to or from
which transportation is provided"), with Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d
334, 336 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (holding that "services" includes items such as
ticketing, boarding procedures, provision of food and drink, and baggage
handling).
43 Hodges, 44 F.3d at 336.
FEDERAL PREEMPTION
sion of the quid pro quo for passenger's [sic] fare."44 Indeed, in
Delta's case, the procurement of alcoholic beverages is a service
for which most of its passengers are charged an additional fee; it
is a contractual exchange between the passenger and the air car-
rier much like that between a bartender and customer, only this
bar happens to have wings.4 5
Furthermore, Townsend's claim clearly "relates" to this airline
service in a manner that is neither tenuous, remote, nor periph-
eral. Townsend's complaint is that Georgia common and statu-
tory law prohibit the manner in which Delta provided beverage
service to its passengers; thus, Georgia law would, in effect, con-
trol the way airlines must provide this service.46 The nexus be-
tween the state law and the airline service could scarcely be
more evident. Moreover, the Supreme Court of Georgia's sup-
position that the Georgia General Assembly did not intend the
GDSA to address the airline industry is irrelevant under preemp-
tion analysis.47 The Supreme Court of the United States plainly
rejected the idea that "only state laws specifically addressed to
the airline industry are preempted, whereas the ADA imposes
no constraints on laws of general applicability."4 Ultimately,
when a cause of action is brought under a state's dram shop act
as it applies to an airline service, preemption is mandated by the
ADA.
The preclusion of federal question jurisdiction is the probable
result of allowing the co-existence of a state statute and federal
regulation addressing the same issue. A federal court would
have to exercise adjudication of the federal claim under federal
question jurisdiction, but it would have the option of rejecting a
motion to remove a state action filed under its dram shop act.4"
If a federal court refuses to remove the state action, an air car-
rier could be forced to litigate matters that should be pre-
empted under the federal statute in state court. This is
problematic because dram shop legislation differs considerably
from state to state. 51' Air carriers providing interstate flight ser-
44 Id. at 337 (citing 44 Fed. Reg. 9948, 9951 (Feb. 15, 1979)).
45 Delta Airlines Beverage Service, http://www.delta.com/traveling-checkin/
inflight-services/ food/index.jsp (last visited Oct. 12, 2005).
46 Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Townsend, 614 S.E.2d 745, 747 (Ga. 2005).
47 Id. at 749.
41 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 386 (1992).
49 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West 1993); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(c) (West 1993).
50 For example, three elements must be met tinder the Georgia statute before
liability attaches: (1) alcohol must be served to an intoxicated person, (2) the
server must know that the person will soon be driving, and (3) the service of
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vice would have no way of knowing under which state statute
they might eventually be sued and, likewise, no way of knowing
which procedures to undertake before serving alcohol to pro-
tect themselves from suit. The ADA was enacted in large part to
prevent this confusion by providing a uniform framework of lia-
bility.51 Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Georgia should have
ruled that claims against airlines arising under the GDSA are
preempted by the ADA instead of addressing the merits of
Townsend's claim and inviting future claimants to waste judicial
resources by improperly litigating federal matters in state court.
alcohol must have been the proximate cause of the resulting injury. GA. CODE
ANN. § 51-1-40(b) (West 1998). In contrast, the California statute only requires
service of alcohol to a noticeably intoxicated individual to establish liability. CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West 2003).
51 See Morales, 504 U.S. at 378.
